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INTRODUCTION
In October 1957, the people of the world gazed at the heavens in
hopes of witnessing mankind's first step into outer space: the Soviet
satellite, Sputnik 1.1 Since then, humans have walked the moon, and
1. See The Nation: Red Moon Over the U.S., TIME, Oct. 14, 1957,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,862748-1,00.html (describing
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continued to launch satellites to explore our solar system.2 For the
most part, national governments have borne the responsibility for
these exploratory missions because of their enormous cost.'
Nevertheless, over the years, private enterprises have shown their
ability to make use of outer space, as these companies maintain
networks of communication and remote sensing satellites.4 Soon,
tourism will join these ventures as customers already are lining up to
experience zero-gravity.' The efforts of private actors to develop
outer space, however, are complicated by legal ambiguities.6
the Smithsonian's efforts to use its network of amateur star-gazers to track Sputnik
I's flight path over the United States).
2. See, e.g., The Pioneer Missions, NASA (Mar. 26, 2007),
http://www.nasa.gov/centers/ames/missions/archive/pioneer.html (detailing the
history of a series of U.S. space probes, including Pioneer 10, the first manmade
object to cross the Asteroid Belt).
3. See, e.g., James J. Trimble, The International Law of Outer Space and its
Effect on Commercial Space Activity, 11. PEPP. L. REv. 521, 522 n.4 (1984)
(contrasting the earlier trend of private "land-based exploration" with space travel,
which requires advanced technology and significantly more resources than private
enterprises can generally afford). This was particularly true in the early years of the
space program. Compare 1974 NASA Authorization, Part 2: Hearing on H.R. 4567
and H.R. 7528 Before the Subcomm. on Manned Space Flight of the H. Comm. on
Science and Astronautics, 93rd Cong. 1271 (1973) (estimating the Apollo
Program's total cost at $25.4 billion), with Fortune 500: 1969 Full List, FORTUNE,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/ fortune500_archive/full/1969/ (last
visited May 12, 2011) (listing the 1969 revenues and profits for major private
companies, including U.S. Steel's total profits of $253.7 million, which
demonstrates that private enterprises lacked the necessary resources to spend on
the U.S. space program).
4. See generally Kelly M. Zullo, Note, The Need to Clarify the Status of
Property Rights in International Space Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 2413, 2436 (2002)
(describing the significant benefits of the modem commercial satellite industry
including "valuable communications, remote sensing, and navigational services" as
well as employment opportunities).
5. See Nikhil D. Cooper, Note, Circumventing Non-Appropriation: Law and
Development of United States Space Commerce, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457,
457 (2009)(describing the first "space-tourist," Dennis Tito's, six-day trip to the
International Space Station in 2001 as the event that marks the beginning of the
commercialization of outer space). To date, most space tourists have traveled as
paying customers aboard national space vehicles, however, private companies are
in the process of developing their own vehicles for space travel. See, e.g., Brian
Deagon, Tourists Close to Conquering Final Frontier, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY
(June 18, 2010, 4:13 PM), http://www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/
Article.aspx?id=537806 (noting that Blue Origin, Armadillo Aerospace, and
Virgin Galactic are among the companies developing vehicles for space tourism,
and describing one company's plan to send the first space tourists on a trip around
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Given the significant costs involved,' space mining is one such
goal that will not come to fruition without a clear statement of what
is permitted under international law.' There is great potential for
utilizing extraterrestrial resources, as minerals on celestial bodies-
the moon, asteroids, and other planets-could represent an
astronomical sum of money.' The moon alone is believed to contain
enough Helium-3 to supply the world's energy needs through fusion
reactors.o Moreover, in situ resource utilization could provide the
the moon at a cost of $100 million per passenger).
6. See Zullo, supra note 4, at 2432-33, 38-39 (noting that legal and policy
ambiguities around private appropriation in space hinders commercial enterprise
since investors generally avoid risk unless there is a "reasonable chance to recover
all costs"); see also Future Lunar, Martian Colony Property Rights May Have
Legal Hitch, 8 INSIDE FAA, Apr. 27, 2003 (explaining that the private sector's
profit motives are often incompatible with the government's need to regulate space
technology to ensure national defense and promote "humanitarian space projects").
7. See, e.g., FUTRON CORP., SPACE TRANSPORTATION COSTS: TRENDS IN
PRICE PER POUND TO ORBrr 1990-2000 (2002), available at
http://www.futron.com/upload/wysiwyg/Resources/Whitepapers/Space Transporta
tion CostsTrends_0902.pdf (noting that the cost of transportation is the biggest
obstacle to the exploitation of resources in space, despite significant drops in the
"price per pound to orbit" in the 1990s).
8. See Ezra J. Reinstein, Owning Outer Space, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 59,
62-68 (1999) (describing how ambiguous language in the current law governing
property rights in outer space undermines efforts to explore and exploit
extraterrestrial resources, and arguing that "a new law of space real property must
enliven and support" the rights to permanent possession, unlimited use, exclusion,
and transfer to incentivize "efficient development of space").
9. See Mark Sonter, Asteroid Mining: Key to the Space Economy, SPACE.COM
(Feb. 9, 2006, 6:51 AM), http://www.space.com/adastra /060209_adastra
mining.html (estimating that some celestial objects could be worth $500,000 per
ton and will be an attractive source of materials once the transportation costs are
reduced). But see The Great Asteroid Mining Con, RONALD BRAK'S BLOGSPOT
(Feb. 6, 2006, 6:42 AM), http://ronaldbrak.blogspot.com /2006/02/great-asteroid-
mining-con.html (casting doubt on the claims of space mining optimists by citing
extraction technology, transportation costs, and the unpredictable effects of
asteroid minerals on world markets as barriers to a viable space mining industry).
10. See Russian Space Co. Says Hopes to Start Extracting Helium on Moon,
RIA NovoSTI (May 18, 2006, 4:37 PM), http://en.rian.ru/
russia/20060518/48306511 .html (reporting that one company hoped to begin
extracting Helium-3 from the moon within the next ten years in an effort to
supplement dwindling oil and gas resources). See generally FABIO TRONCHETTI,
THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE MOON AND OTHER
CELESTIAL BODIES: A PROPOSAL FOR A LEGAL REGIME 6 (F.G. von der Dunk ed.,
2009) (elaborating on the potential for Helium-3, which is "scarcely present on
Earth but abundant on the Moon," to generate nuclear power without producing
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raw materials for a manned outpost's fuel, construction materials,
and life support systems." Thus, the fate of space exploration and
enterprise may depend on whether astronauts can make use of the
celestial environment, rather than rely on terrestrial resources.
International law, however, does not clearly allow for good legal title
to any materials that a company harvests from outer space.12 Without
a change in the current legal regime, future generations will have
access only to the finite resources on Earth, complicating humanity's
inevitable exploration of the stars.13
This Comment argues that international law does not effectively
address the issue of property rights to extraterrestrial resources.
While many claim the Moon Treaty's use of the common heritage of
mankind principle prohibits the exploitation of extraterrestrial
resources, that document's limited acceptance by spacefaring nations
renders it practically useless. Accordingly, this Comment focuses
instead on an earlier treaty, the Outer Space Treaty ("OST"), to
analyze the status of resource property rights for private actors. It
conducts this analysis by using the methodology established in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna Convention");
by looking first to define the OST through an objective reading of its
text and next through the use of supplementary means of
interpretation, this Comment finds that the drafters of the OST were
not concerned with resource property rights. This Comment therefore
toxic waste).
11. See Jon Excell, Mining the Moon, THE ENGINEER (Apr. 24, 2009),
http://www.theengineer.co.uk/in-depth/mining-themoon/310927. article
(hypothesizing that lunar resources such as water, hydrogen, oxygen, aluminum,
and titanium, could be invaluable catalysts for exploring the rest of the solar
system, while recognizing the uncertainty around the existence and usefulness of
such resources on the Moon).
12. See Cooper, supra note 5, at 461-62 (arguing that the Outer Space Treaty's
protection of property rights in terrestrial objects launched into space is
inconsistent with its lack of protection for property rights in extraterrestrial
bodies).
13. Cf Zullo, supra note 4, at 2439 (describing how commercial involvement
allowed the Human Genome Project to accomplish its goal two years earlier than
expected, lending credibility to the benefit of a profit motive in science). But see,
THOMAS GANGALE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUTER SPACE: SOVEREIGNTY AND
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 202-06 (2009) (questioning
whether free enterprise is the panacea for space development by highlighting the
myriad technological challenges to cost-efficient travel in the "extreme
environment" of outer space).
2011] 148 1
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recommends that new discussions should be held to address this legal
lacuna in a way that allows celestial bodies, as distinct from outer
space, to be subject to prospecting missions.
To establish context for whether private companies are prohibited
from developing outer space, Part II of this Comment explains
several property theories, the development of maritime and Antarctic
treaties that relate to property rights in those areas, and the relevant
sources of space law.14 Part III employs the methodology of the
Vienna Convention to reject the Moon Treaty's relevance given its
limited impact on spacefaring nations." Then, Part III conducts a
good faith interpretation of the OST's property provisions, taking
into account contextual information that clarifies the drafters'
intent.16 Part IV recommends that the U.N. Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ("COPUOS") should solicit opinions
from states and interested parties with a view to establishing
theoretical answers to problems related to extraterrestrial resources.17
In doing so, COPUOS should firstly distinguish outer space from
celestial bodies and secondly allow states and private actors to send
prospecting missions to celestial bodies to research the feasibility of
mining without granting exclusive property rights.'8 Such an
incremental approach to extraterrestrial property rights strikes the
appropriate balance between the need for increased exploration by
private actors with governmental concerns regarding the exploitation
and appropriation of resources in outer space.
14. See discussion, infra Part II (distinguishing the res communis theory from
the common heritage of mankind principle, providing two examples of modem
maritime law, and describing the differences between the two applicable space
treaties).
15. See discussion, infra Part III.A (employing the Vienna Convention to refute
the Moon Treaty on the basis that it cannot apply to third parties).
16. See discussion, infra Part III.B-C (relying on the Vienna Convention to
guide an investigation into OST's definition, first through an objective reading of
the text, and second, through the use of supplementary means of interpretation).
17. See discussion, infra Part IV (recommending COPUOS as the appropriate
body to research possibilities for future space law, as states will recognize that it
can do so without conferring additional legal responsibilities).
18. See discussion, infra Part IV (detailing two distinct issues that might be
taken into consideration as ways of allowing for appropriate treaty making and
informed discussion).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. PROPERTY THEORIES
Whether private actors may extract mineral resources from
celestial bodies is largely determined by how property interests in
those areas are defined.'9 Traditionally, debates over new land, or
rather land not already subject to sovereign control, focus on two
concepts derived from Roman law: res nullius and res communis
omnium.2 0 The concept of res nullius applies to an area that does not
belong to anyone at present but may be appropriated by any natural
or juridical person.2 1 In contrast, res communis omnium applies to
areas that are accessible to all, but which no person or State may
own.2 2 Much controversy over space law revolves around a third
concept that expands upon res communis omnium-the common
heritage of mankind principle-and whether it applies in this case.23
The common heritage of mankind is a twentieth-century creation.24
Its proponents sought to articulate a new legal concept that would
allow humanity to explore new frontiers, without risking the dangers
that plagued centuries of land-based conquest.2 5 The doctrine is
19. Cf J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAw 2-3 (1997)
(acknowledging the abstract nature of "property").
20. See TRONCHETTI, supra note 10, at 10 (noting that scholars applied these
concepts to outer space in the early years of space exploration).
21. See id at 10-11 (supporting the argument that individual nations can claim
sovereignty over celestial bodies through "effective occupation" in the same way
that many European countries claimed parts of the New World and Africa).
22. See id. at 11-12 (claiming that outer space is "open for exploration, use, and
exploitation by all States" on an equal basis).
23. See, e.g., Lynn M. Fountain, Note, Creating Momentum in Space: Ending
the Paralysis Produced by the "Common Heritage of Mankind" Doctrine, 35
CONN. L. REV. 1753, 1753 n.3 (2003) (arguing that the Common Heritage doctrine
should not apply to outer space because it represents a classic "tragedy of the
commons" problem and fails to efficiently allocate resources). See also discussion
infra Parts III.A-C (arguing that the Common Heritage doctrine does not apply to
spacefaring nations and that, in reality, space is only a res communis).
24. See Fountain, supra note 23, at 1758 n. 39, 1761-65 (noting that the
Common Heritage doctrine developed during early discussions on the Law of the
Sea, and was later integrated into space law instruments such as the OST and the
Moon Treaty).
25. See generally Ryan Hugh O'Donnell, Comment, Staking a Claim in the
Twenty-First Century: Real Property Rights on Extraterrestrial Bodies, 32 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 461, 468-69 (2007) (describing the tumultuous Age of Discovery
when Europe colonized North America, namely the conflict that arose over land
2011]1 1483
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comprised of several elements and generally provides that: (1) the
designated areas shall not be appropriated, (2) the use of the area and
its resources will be managed by an international authority, (3)
benefits from the area will be actively and equitably shared, (4) the
area will be peacefully used, and (5) the area's resources will be
protected and preserved for the benefit of all mankind.2 6 This goes
beyond the principle of a res communis in that even the ownership of
movable resources in a common heritage area is forbidden without
international consent.2 7
B. SOURCES OF SPACE LAW CONCERNING PROPERTY RIGHTS
Shortly after the Soviets launched Sputnik 1, diplomatic
machinations created the U.N.'s focus group for outer space: the
COPUOS.2 8 This body's work contributed to several early
resolutions that, if not legally binding, at least allowed international
opinion to coalesce before moving on to treaty drafting. 29 Five
treaties were then drafted and entered into force in a relatively brief
and resources, which led to repetitious warfare).
26. Fountain, supra note 23, at 1759. This doctrine originated from discussions
on the high seas, where a Maltese U.N. delegate, Arvid Pardo, proposed to apply
the concept to the deep seabed. See Jefferson H. Weaver, Illusion or Reality? State
Sovereignty in Outer Space, 10 B.U. INT'L L.J. 203, 220 (1992) (stating that
Ambassador Pardo of Malta suggested that the ocean floor under the high seas be
under global ownership and he proposed that this principle be incorporated into a
binding U.N. document); see also Jeremy L. Zell, Note, Putting a Mine on the
Moon: Creating an International Authority to Regulate Mining Rights in Outer
Space, 15 MINN. J. INT'L L. 489, 495-96 (2006) (noting the origins of the common
heritage principle as a method to ensure the equal sharing of benefits from new
spheres of human activity, and can be a lens through which to view the Moon
Agreement).
27. See discussion infra Part III.C.4.
28. See CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 14-15 (1982) (noting that five of the Committee's original eighteen
members - Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Soviet Union, India, and the United Arab
Republic - boycotted the Committee's first meetings until the United States and the
Soviet Union agreed to add four additional States from the Soviet bloc to the
Committee's membership).
29. See id. at 14 (enumerating the legal problems that the Committee agreed
were important at the advent of the space age, including the question of exploration
and use of extraterrestrial resources, and referencing peaceful use and free access
for all states as touchstone principles); Vladimir Kopal, Evolution of the Doctrine
of Space Law, in SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 17, 23 (Nandasiri
Jasentuliyana ed., 1992) (explaining the early history of space law scholars and
their relative agreement on major issues by the 1960s).
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time period, between 1967 and 1979.30
Each treaty was concluded against a Cold War backdrop, and the
first was adopted during the race to the Moon." Indeed, the era's
perceived dangers weighed heavily on the drafters' minds.32 This
Comment focuses on two of these documents: the OST and the
Moon Treaty.
1. The Outer Space Treaty
The General Assembly adopted the OST on December 19, 1966,11
which laid the foundation upon which all other international space
law is built.34 It addresses a number of issues, ranging from
weaponization to national liability for space launch problems.
Despite its breadth, or perhaps because of it, the treaty language
30. See generally Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon
Treaty]; Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15; Convention
on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24
U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the
Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119; Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter OST].
31. See Cooper, supra note 5, at 459 (describing the 1960s "Space Race"
climate in which the OST was adopted and emphasizing how the first nation to
reach the moon would be the apparent winner of that Cold War theater, a race
which climaxed with Apollo 11, the U.S. launch that landed the first man on the
Moon).
32. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Thomas, Spatialis Liberum, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV.
579, 589-90 (2006) (stating that the United States and the Soviet Union decided to
avoid the risk of losing that contest by signing onto OST, so neither could
conclusively claim space superiority).
33. G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2222(XXI) (Dec. 19, 1966).
34. See TRONCHETTI, supra note 10, at 18-19 (describing the OST as the
"Magna Charta of space law").
35. See OST, supra note 30, arts. 4, 6, 7 (providing that states shall neither
place nor test weapons of mass destruction in outer space, and holding states liable
for damage by both private and public national space activities); see also Stephen
Gorove, Sources and Principles of Space Law, in SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT AND
SCOPE, supra note 29, at 45, 46-47 (explaining that the OST's broad freedoms,
such as freedom of exploration and universal access, are limited by specific
provisions like the requirements to act in the interest of all countries, to promote
cooperation, and to avoid environmental contamination or national appropriation).
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varies in specificity. 6 This ambiguity reflects the urgency with
which the treaty was created; there was great pressure to establish
international space law before either the United States or the Soviet
Union reached the moon.37
Consequently, the two provisions necessary for an analysis of
property rights in outer space are particularly vague: Articles 1 and
2.38 Article 1 addresses the general freedom of use, declaring that
outer space and celestial bodies "shall be the province of all
mankind."39 It also provides for the liberties of exploration, access,
and scientific investigation.4 0 Essentially, Article 1 establishes a
presumptive freedom of use, while the succeeding provisions qualify
that freedom in a manner which advances the treaty's peaceful
purpose.4 Article 2 limits the freedom of use outlined in Article 1 by
declaring that outer space, including the Moon and other celestial
bodies, is not subject to national appropriation.4 2
An additional provision, Article 6, is necessary for an
investigation of the OST's treatment of property rights.43 By
declaring that a state is liable for its citizens' actions in space, it
serves as a juridical link and prevents the OST from being rendered
36. Cf Weaver, supra note 26, at 218 (speculating that the OST's drafters
intentionally left certain terms ambiguous to allow for changing technologies).
37. See U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [COPUOS],
Legal Subcomm., 5th sess., 57th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.57 (Jul.
12, 1966) [hereinafter COPUOS, 5th Sess., 57th Mtg.] (statement by Mr.
Waldheim, Comm. Chairman) (recognizing the importance of devising a treaty
prior to the imminent manned mission to the moon to avoid an arms race or
territory grab and help secure peace in space).
38. See OST, supra note 30, arts. 1-2; see also discussion infra Parts III.B-C
(demonstrating the impact of Articles I & 2 on a state's right to use outer space
and the controversial impact this has on private actors).
39. See id. art. 1 (establishing that all countries are to enjoy the benefits of
space exploration, "irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
development").
40. See id. (guaranteeing equality to all states in their liberty to pursue such
activities).
41. See, e.g., id. art. 4 (prohibiting states from establishing military bases in
outer space and conducting military exercises on celestial bodies).
42. See id. art 2 (declaring that nations may not appropriate outer space or
celestial bodies by "claim of sovereignty," "use or occupation," or "any other
means").
43. See id. art. 6 (establishing that states are responsible for all national space
activities and that non-governmental organizations must receive authorization by
the state for any activities performed in outer space).
1486 [26:5
EXTRATERRESTRIAL RESOURCE EXTRACTION
toothless by actors who do not fit neatly into the category of
sovereign state.44 Thus, the OST applies to both private and state
space activities.
2. The Moon Treaty
The Moon Treaty's place in space law is less certain.45 It was
adopted on December 5, 1979 and just barely entered into force.46
The treaty has failed to receive much support, so it is not considered
a binding element of international space law.47 Article 11 is likely a
main reason for the treaty's limited acceptance.48 Although similar to
Article 2 of the OST, Article 11 is distinctive in that it further
regulates lunar activities. 49 The additional restrictions in Article 11
highlight the drafters' intent to limit conflict over lunar resources.s0
To prevent all of the benefits of lunar exploration from going to a
small group of developed states, Article 11 also calls for the
establishment of an international organization to manage natural
44. See O'Donnell, supra note 25, at 477-78 (observing that the OST's
restrictions on states must necessarily apply to private actors because, otherwise,
states could indirectly assert sovereignty over outer space vis-a-vis the claims of
the private actors for which they are responsible pursuant to Article 6).
45. See Fountain, supra note 23, at 1764 (arguing that few nations accepted the
Moon Treaty due to its explicit acceptance of the Common Heritage doctrine, and
the resultant negative impact on the commercial development of outer space).
46. G.A. Res. 34/68, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/68 (Dec. 5, 1979); see also
CHRISTOL, supra note 28, at 311-12, 315-17 (recognizing that even though some
major space powers, such as the United States, took the lead in drafting the Moon
Treaty, they have been reluctant to become parties to the document for fear of its
impact on their domestic economic interests).
47. See discussion infra Part III.B (arguing that the Moon Treaty has little
impact because it has not been ratified by many states, including the spacefaring
nations).
48. See Moon Treaty, supra note 30, art. 11 (providing the treaty's rules
governing resource use and exploitation).
49. Compare OST, supra note 30, art. 2 (establishing that the moon "is not
subject to national appropriation") with Moon Treaty, supra note 30, art. 11
(providing that "[t]he moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of
mankind" and "[n]either the surface nor the subsurface of the moon . . . shall
become property of any State"). "The additional restrictions in Article 11 highlight
the drafters' intent to limit conflict over lunar resources."
50. See Moon Treaty, supra note 30, arts. 2, 11 (articulating the Treaty's
purpose to promote peace by prohibiting ownership of the Moon). See generally
discussion infra Part III.C (explaining the common heritage of mankind principle's
origins and general provisions).
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resources and redistribute benefits among nations."
C. MODELS FOR OUTER SPACE: THE HIGH SEAS & ANTARCTICA
If space is the final frontier, then an analysis of its legal regime
could draw from lessons derived from the penultimate frontier: the
high seas.5 2 Earth's oceans and seas were once the domain of
conquering armadas and privateers, when good legal title required as
little as arbitrary lines drawn on a map." By the 17th-century,
arguments emerged for recognition of a "free sea," where states
equally shared access and none was allowed to obstruct the use of
that privilege.54 Hundreds of years and many naval conflicts later, the
idea of a free sea is generally a reality."
51. See Moon Treaty, supra note 30, art. 11(5)-(7) (calling for resource
exploitation only under the guidance and control of the international community to
ensure the "orderly and safe" development of natural resources, yet failing to
provide guidelines as to how such an "international r6gime" should be established).
52. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 32, at 601-02 (noting that the physical
similarities between the high seas and outer space make the analogy apt, and
further observing that both inspire similar thoughts of "exploration, possibility,
expansion, technological evolution, colonization, scientific experimentation,
fascination with the unknown, and increased freedom of movement"). But see, e.g.,
U.N. GAOR, COPUOS, Legal Subcomm., 5th Sess., 71st mtg. at 20, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.71 (addendum 1) (Aug. 4, 1966) [hereinafter COPUOS, 5th
Sess., 71st mtg.] (statement by Mr. Tello Macias of Mexico) (arguing that
analogies drawn between the high seas and outer space were of limited benefit due
to differences in the areas, such as the inherent problem of defining the borders of
outer space).
53. See, e.g., O'Donnell, supra note 25, at 468-69 (discussing the 1494 Treaty
of Tordesillas, which settled a dispute between Spain and Portugal over land in
South America by identifying the longitude 47 27 W as the dividing line).
54. See HUGO GROTIUs, THE FREE SEA 49-51 (David Armitage ed., Richard
Hakluyt trans., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2004) (1609) (recognizing the right to free
navigation of the high seas as inherent in the established right to freedom of trade).
Grotius' work, Mare Liberum, generally represents the original argument for
freedom of the seas. See id. at xi-xii (providing the historical context for the
original publication of Mare Liberum, which was the resolution of conflict
between the Dutch and the Spanish after the Dutch revolt in the late sixteenth
century).
55. See discussion infra Parts II.C.1-2 (describing the modern maritime
treaties' interpretations of the law of the sea). Cf H.A. SMiTH, THE LAW AND
CUSTOM OF THE SEA 64-72 (tracing the history of modern sea law from the 17th-
century to the early postwar era, and noting that the right of all nations to navigate
the high seas may conflict with a nation's right to interfere with an enemy's
maritime trade during wartime).
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Two modem maritime treaties are relevant to a discussion of
extraterrestrial property rights: the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
High Seas and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS").5 6
Similarly, the international community has formulated a treaty
system to govern another barren region that was not traditionally
subject to sovereign control: Antarctica. Thus, the Antarctic Treaty
is also relevant to this analysis."
1. 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas
This treaty was the first post-World War II declaration of states'
rights on the high seas." It articulated rules governing the waters
beyond those defined as territorial seas and contiguous zones. 5 9 Four
liberties emerged from this document: navigation, fishing, laying
submarine cables and pipelines, and overflight. 60 This list was neither
exhaustive nor a grant of absolute freedom as other treaties qualified
56. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S.
82; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. See also Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
of 10 December 1982 pmbl., July 28, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 41 [hereinafter
Implementation Agreement] (modifying UNCLOS to attract more international
support).
57. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71
[hereinafter Antarctic Treaty]; see also Fountain, supra note 23, at 1769-70
(describing the many similarities between outer space and Antarctica, including the
fact that both areas contain valuable natural resources which are difficult to
exploit, and citing the Antarctic Treaty System as highly influential in
development of space law).
58. See generally Tullio Treves, 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the
Sea, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INT'L LAW, http://untreaty.un.org/
cod/avl/ha/gclos/gclos.html (last visited May 12, 2011) (providing a narrative
history of the work of the first U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, and
concluding that the 1958 Convention essentially codified the state of customary
law as it existed at the time).
59. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 56, art. 2 (providing for free
access to the high seas pursuant to certain conditions as they are "open to all
nations"); see also Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zones arts. 1,
7, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (recognizing that a state's
territory extends to its "internal waters" and defining the high seas as those waters
approximately twenty-four miles from the coast).
60. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 56, art. 2.
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the freedoms to ensure reasonable use of the seas.61 Yet, the high
seas convention remained an expansive document, granting land-
locked states the right to sail the oceans by requiring their coastal
neighbors to grant free passage over land and through territorial
waters. 2
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
The Third Conference on the Law of the Sea set out to resolve
ambiguities in the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the
Sea.63 The result was a comprehensive agreement that replaced the
first Conference's 1958 treaties, which, among other things, created a
regime for territorial waters. 64 This system starts with a full grant of
sovereignty at the coast and is followed by a series of zones that
incrementally diminish such rights, until reaching the high seas
where sovereignty is forbidden.65
In addition to the four freedoms recognized in the 1958
Convention, UNCLOS articulates the additional freedoms to
construct artificial islands and to conduct scientific research.66
UNCLOS qualifies the freedom to fish, however, as it incorporates
61. See id (conditioning these freedoms on compliance with "rules of
international law" and requiring states parties to respect the rights and interests of
other states when exercising these freedoms on the high seas); see also Convention
on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas art. 1, Apr. 29,
1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (regulating the use of resources in the
common area of the high seas, subject to treaty obligations, by calling on states to
work together so their use does not prevent other states from enjoying the same
fisheries).
62. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 56, art. 3 (granting "free
transit" by "reciprocity" through a sea-coast state).
63. See generally Tullio Treves, United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INT'L LAW, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/
avlha/uncls/uncls.html (last visited May 12, 2011) (detailing the events that led to
the third UNCLOS, including the new geopolitical climate that fomented the
development of the common heritage of mankind principle, one of the items on the
Conference's agenda of issues to address).
64. See id. (describing UNCLOS's separate treatment of different maritime
zones, and noting the changed definition of territorial sea: "maximum breadth ...
is fixed at 12 miles and that of the continuous zone at 24 miles").
65. See UNCLOS, supra note 56, arts. 3, 33, 47, 57, 76, 86 (defining the
various maritime zones, including the territorial sea and contiguous zones near the
coast, the exclusive economic zone within 200 nautical miles from the baseline of
the territorial sea, the continental shelf, and finally the high seas).
66. See id. art. 87.
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several provisions that require states to respect other states' rights
and conserve the living resources of the high seas.67
UNCLOS takes a different approach with respect to mineral
resources. 68 Part XI governs the use of seabed minerals, 6 9 and
declares that this area is the common heritage of mankind.7 0 It further
defines this provision by declaring that no state or person may
appropriate the seabed's natural resources.7 1 Instead, UNCLOS calls
for the establishment of an International Seabed Authority to regulate
the exploitation of these resources. 2 This body would promote the
transfer of technology and scientific research among the State
Parties.73
Many states chose not to ratify the treaty, fearful that UNCLOS
would be harmful to their economic interests.7 4 Eventually, there was
67. See id. arts. 116-120 (prohibiting states from acting in ways that prevent
other states from enjoying the freedoms of the sea, for instance, by overfishing,
and announcing that interested states shall promulgate regulations, beyond
UNCLOS, for how particular fisheries may be used to restore fish populations and
conserve living resources).
68. See id art. 133 (defining "resources" as "solid, liquid, [and] gaseous
mineral resources" which are found "at or beneath the seabed" of the high seas,
separating them from the living resources governed under Part 7).
69. See id. art. 134 (distinguishing seabed mineral regulations from those
applicable to the high seas in Part VI).
70. Id. arts. 136-37; see id. art. 140 (supplementing Article 136 by stating that
all activities shall "be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole").
71. See id. art. 137 (extending UNCLOS regulations to public and private
entities, including individuals).
72. See id. arts. 156-58 (calling for a body that would process applications for
seabed mining and distribute the benefits of such ventures and laying out the
organs of such a body).
73. See id. arts. 143-44 (providing guidelines as to what goals the Authority
should try to accomplish, such as participating in international programs, fostering
technological advancement, and encouraging a transfer of scientific knowledge to
developing States). Interestingly, the United States was both a leading party in the
negotiations for Part XI and one of its most vehement critics. U.S. negotiators
were a moving force behind its development, but by the time UNCLOS was open
for ratification, there had been a political sea change in U.S. politics that prevented
(and continues to prevent) the federal government from unwaveringly supporting
the Part's provisions. See generally Louise de La Fayette, Book Review, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 212 (1992) (reviewing Markus G. Schmidt, Common Heritage or
Common Burden? The United States Position on the Development of a Regime for
Deep Sea-Bed Mining in the Law of the Sea Convention (1989)).
74. See, e.g., John Adolph, Comment, The Recent Boom in Private Space
Development and the Necessity of an International Framework Embracing Private
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a push to renegotiate the treaty so as to achieve broader consensus.7 5
The resulting treaty attracted "near-universal" support for
UNCLOS.7 6 This new treaty modified UNCLOS so that provisions
for limited seabed production and mandatory technology transfers
would not be applied to the new signatories.
3. Antarctica
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 entered into force on June 23, 1961,
establishing the first document of what grew into the Antarctic
Treaty System. This Treaty has slightly different roots than that for
the oceans, as not all states sought to explore the former area.7 9 States
explored the region for more than a century before they realized its
economic and scientific potential. 0 By then, several nations had
made claims of sovereignty over parts of the continent, while others
declined to do so." Interested parties established a treaty to avoid
Property Rights to Encourage Investment, 40 INT'L LAW. 961, 972-73 (2006)
(explaining that industrialized states' reluctance to ratify the treaty stemmed from
UNCLOS's adoption of the common heritage principle, which essentially ensured
access and control "regardless of [a nation's] technological capabilities or
contributions to undersea exploration").
75. See id at 973 (noting that the United Nations attempted to mitigate the
chilling effect of the common heritage doctrine on commercial mining nearly
twelve years after UNCLOS was adopted).
76. See 2 E.D. BROWN, SEA-BED ENERGY AND MiNERALS: THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME: SEA-BED MINING 11-13 (2001) (acknowledging
that several states parties to UNCLOS failed to adopt the Implementation
Agreement, but noting the role of the Implementation Agreement in increasing
acceptance of UNCLOS).
77. See Implementation Agreement, supra note 56, Annex sec. 5, 6; see also
Adolph, supra note 74, at 973 (noting that these changes tempered UNCLOS's
original common heritage mandates).
78. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 57, pmbl., art. 4, (ensuring that the
continent is reserved for peaceful use and preventing new sovereign claims without
renouncing existing sovereign claims).
79. See TRONCHETTI, supra note 10, at 134 (recognizing that states which did
not explore the Antarctic region nevertheless affirmed their right to have input on
the continent's future).
80. See id. at 133 (noting that international interest in Antarctica did not begin
until the late 1940's, sparking a surge of important legal decisions).
81. See id (observing that the United Kingdom, Australia, Argentina, Chile,
Norway, New Zealand, and France all asserted sovereignty over the parts of the
continent they had explored in preceding decades, while other states, including the
United States and the Soviet Union, wished to make claims in the future, and still
others, such as Italy and Germany, did not believe the area could be subject to
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conflict in the area, which would grow into the Antarctic Treaty
System ("ATS"). This system essentially froze sovereign claims as
they appeared in 1959, while prohibiting new assertions of national
control.83 Combined with its other provisions, the ATS was a clear
predecessor of the OST but with a significant difference: the polar
region is subject to lingering sovereign claims.8 4 Attempts were
recently made to regulate the region's mineral resources, providing
the catalyst for some nations to declare it the common heritage of
mankind.
D. A METHOD FOR INTERPRETING TREATIES
The Vienna Convention codifies rules applicable to treaties.8 6
While it addresses a number of issues related to written international
agreements, a particularly important function of this instrument is to
provide a method for interpreting such agreements."
national jurisdiction).
82. See id. at 136-39 (describing the Antarctic Treaty as both "innovative" in
its mandate on states to promote international cooperation and scientific research
on the continent and preservationist with respect to the existing state of sovereignty
claims in Antarctica).
83. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 57, art. 4; see also TRONCHETTI, supra
note 10, at 137-38 (noting that, although this provision was extremely contentious,
it facilitated scientific activity in Antarctica).
84. TRONCHETTI, supra note 10, at 139. See Howard J. Taubenfeld, The
Antarctic and Outer Space: An Analogy in Retrospect, in THE ANTARCTIC LEGAL
REGIME 269, 269 (Christopher C. Joyner & Sudhir K. Chopra eds., 1988)
(explaining that as early as 1958, scholars recognized that space law could draw on
the Antarctic model, as another territory "placed under an internationalized or
'trust' arrangement").
85. See TRONCHETTI, supra note 10, at 141-48 (noting that the Organization of
African Unity, and many other developing countries, argued the common heritage
doctrine applies to Antarctica in an effort to thwart attempts by industrialized
nations to develop the continent in phases).
86. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 1, 2, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (establishing the Convention's
scope and defining "treaty" as "an international agreement concluded between
States in written form and governed by international law"). Note that the Vienna
Convention only applies to agreements "concluded between States," and not
international organizations, although this language does not necessarily exclude
agreements concluded with the help of such bodies. Id.
87. See id., supra note 86, arts. 31-33 (outlining the general rule of
interpretation and specifying when primary and secondary sources, such as
preparatory documents, may be used to supplement or enhance understanding of a
treaty's terms).
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Pursuant to Article 31, an analysis requires both a good faith
interpretation of the treaty's text and consideration of its context."
Relevant contextual information includes any treaties that are made
in connection with the primary document, subsequent agreements
and practices, and relevant rules of international law.89 According to
Article 32, further analysis may be required if a term remains
"ambiguous or obscure" or if the apparent definition is "absurd or
unreasonable." 90 Only at that point may the preparatory works and
circumstances surrounding the treaty's conclusion be taken into
account.9'
The Vienna Convention also acknowledges that customary
international law gives rise to legal obligations notwithstanding the
success or failure of a treaty. 92 Thus, if there is consistent state
practice based on a sense of legal obligation, all states may be bound
to obey that norm.93 Customary law is therefore relevant to the
legality of space mining because if the treaties are ambiguous, it
nonetheless may be used to restrict state activities.
III. ANALYSIS
The right of governments and private organizations to extract
minerals in space is unclear because of ambiguities in the OST and
insufficient state practice.94 Although more specific, the Moon Treaty
lacked enough support to bind non-signatory states. 95 Maritime
88. See id. art. 31(1) (providing that the treaty's "object and purpose" control
interpretation of the treaty's terms).
89. Id. art. 31(2)-(3).
90. Id. art. 32.
91. Id.
92. See id. arts. 34, 38 (stating that a treaty's terms may bind a non-party,
despite the general rule that states may only be bound by consent, if the rule
constitutes a recognized "customary rule of international law").
93. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (1945) (declaring that the Court shall look to
"international custom" as a source of applicable law when resolving disputes).
94. Cf O'Donnell, supra note 25, at 462 (noting that space entrepreneurs are
dissuaded by the "unanswered questions" of current space law and recommending
the establishment of a regulatory framework that private industry can use to attain
property rights in space).
95. See discussion, infra Part III.A (showing that in spite of the fact that the
Moon Treaty entered into force, it cannot bind the actions of third-parties,
including all the spacefaring nations).
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applications of the common heritage principle, though persuasive, do
not provide an answer given the differences between the oceans and
outer space.96
A. WHILE THE MOON TREATY'S COMMON HERITAGE OF
MANKIND PRINCIPLE PREVENTS THE EXPLOITATION OF
RESOURCES WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL
BODY, THE TREATY IS NON-BINDING ON THE SPACEFARING
NATIONS.
The Moon Treaty's prohibition on space mining is beyond doubt,
as it employs the common heritage of mankind principle." However,
this principle is ultimately of little importance because the treaty is
not binding on the current spacefaring nations.9 8
1. Moon Treaty Interpretation
A good faith interpretation of the Moon Treaty pursuant to the
Vienna Convention methodology confirms that it incorporates this
restrictive property theory.99 Cognizant of the benefits derived from
using the Moon's natural resources, the Moon Treaty drafters sought
to peacefully encourage such development on an equal basis. 10
96. See discussion infra Part III.C (demonstrating that maritime law is
persuasive but an imperfect analogy for outer space).
97. See Moon Treaty, supra note 30, art. 11(1)-(3) (emphasizing that the Moon
is immune to sovereignty claims and that the lunar surface as well as subsurface
materials are not subject to appropriation).
98. See Treaty Signatures, UN OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosatdb/showTreatySignatures.do (last visited May 12,
2010) (listing Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Mexico,
Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, and Uruguay as the only
parties to the Moon Treaty); see also CHRISTOL, supra note 28, at 311, 315
(discussing the United States' reluctance to ratify the Treaty, despite its role in the
drafting phases, out of its concern about foreclosing the possibility of securing
lunar resources in the future).
99. See Vienna Convention, supra note 86, art. 31 (specifying that "good faith
interpretation" requires looking at the "ordinary meaning" of the terms in relation
to the treaty's text, preamble, annex, related agreements, or international law, and
in light of the treaty's "object and purpose"); see also MARK E. VILLIGER,
COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 426-
27 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) (explaining that Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention calls for the ordinary meaning of treaty terms to be established in their
context, meaning all sentences, paragraphs, and articles of the treaty).
100. See Moon Treaty, supra note 30, pmbl. (recognizing the Moon's potential
2011]1 1495
AM. U.INTLL.REV.
Reflecting this commitment, Article 11 declares that the Moon and
its resources are the common heritage of mankind.01
Looking at the term in context, subsequent clauses within Article
11 give substance to the common heritage provision and establish the
theory's five general elements. 10 2 First, sections 2 and 3 of Article 11
declare that the area is not subject to national appropriation by any
means. 0 3 Second, section 5 calls for the establishment of an
international body to manage the use of the area's natural
resources.'0 4 Third, section 7 states that benefits derived from lunar
exploitation shall be equitably shared among nations, including those
which did not undertake exploratory programs.' Fourth, peaceful
use is guaranteed through section 4, which notes that State Parties
have the right to use the Moon in accordance with international law
and the other terms of the treaty. 06 Finally, section 7's call for the
rational management of resources provides for the doctrine's final
element, to protect and to preserve them so as to benefit all
mankind. 0 7 The treaty's treatment of property rights on the Moon is
therefore quite clear after reading Article 11 's inclusion of the
common heritage principle along with the rest of the treaty. 08
Accordingly, this interpretation obviates the need to use additional
sources for clarification purposes.109
to spark "international conflict" in the absence of consensus around the use of its
resources).
101. See id art. 11 (prohibiting ownership of the Moon's surface and subsurface
minerals and calling for an "international rdgime" to ensure their "safe
development," "rational management," and equitable use).
102. See id. (providing additional regulations as to what constitutes
impermissible behavior on the Moon, such as national appropriation and
discriminatory exploration); see also Fountain, supra note 23, at 1759
(enumerating the five elements that are generally recognized to comprise the
common heritage of mankind principle, including eliminating national
appropriation, sharing management of the region, equal sharing of the exploitation
of resources, peaceful use of the area, and preservation for the future).
103. Moon Treaty, supra note 30, art. 11(2)-(3).
104. Id. art. 11(5).
105. See id art. 11(7) (declaring that benefits of lunar exploration shall be
shared without providing clear criteria as to how that should be accomplished).
106. Id. art. 11(4). See id. arts. 2-3 (emphasizing that the Moon shall be used for
peaceful purposes and with the goal of maintaining international peace).
107. Id. art. 11(7).
108. See VILLIGER, supra note 99, at 427 (recognizing that treaty interpretation
must arise from the totality of the text, rather than isolated sections).
109. See Vienna Convention, supra note 86, art. 32 (providing that
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Despite this result, the Moon Treaty has little practical impact on
current space law. 0 Though it entered into force, the treaty does not
bind the spacefaring nations because it cannot regulate the behavior
of non-parties without their consent.'" Since the Moon Treaty only
binds a few ratifying states that do not explore space, it is largely
irrelevant to the question at hand.
2. Customary International Law
Of course, treaties are not the only method by which a state may
be bound; spacefaring nations not party to the Moon Treaty may be
bound by its provisions if the provisions have become customary
international law." 2 Since establishing that such norms exist can lead
to even more confusion than results from treaty interpretation, it is
unlikely that the Moon Treaty's terms will bind third parties through
custom."' But a successful analysis of space mining's legality
demands thoroughness, so an examination of custom is nevertheless
"supplementary means of interpretation" need only be consulted to "confirm the
meaning resulting from the application of Article 31" or to determine the meaning
when an Article 31 analysis "leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure" or "leads
to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable").
110. See Fountain, supra note 23, at 1764 (noting that many scholars "consider
[the Moon Treaty] already obsolete" as a result of its limited acceptance by the
international community, and especially spacefaring nations).
111. See Vienna Convention, supra note 86, art. 34. See generally GANGALE,
supra note 13, at 67-88 (detailing the domestic political events in several countries
that led to the Moon Treaty's limited acceptance, for example, the belief of certain
U.S. congressmen that ratification of the Moon Treaty would impede negotiations
on seabed mining in the Law of the Sea Conference).
112. See Vienna Convention, supra note 86, art. 38 ("Nothing ... precludes a
rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary
rule of international law, recognized as such."); see also MAARTEN Bos, A
METHODOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (1984) (explaining that formation of
legal custom requires both the presence of state practice and opiniojuris).
113. Compare Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International
Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule
of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 175, 179-80 (2005)
(assessing state practice through "[b]oth physical and verbal acts" and stating that
state practice must be "virtually uniform" to establish a rule of customary
international law), with Letter from John Bellinger, Legal Adviser, U.S. State
Dep't & William Haynes, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Defense Dep't, to Jakob
Kellenberger, President, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross (Nov. 3, 2006), 46 I.L.M.
514 (relying on the physical acts of states for the generation of customary
international law and warning that undue weight may be given to opinions by non-
governmental organizations as to sufficiency of state practice).
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required.
There is insufficient state practice to claim that the common
heritage doctrine as embodied in the Moon Treaty has become legal
custom, such that non-parties to the Moon Treaty would be
prohibited from space mining. While states have collected geological
samples,1 4 the OST's grant of scientific investigation permits such
activity."' As for space mining, neither states nor their private actors
have attempted to harvest celestial resources, so there is no
demonstrated practice by commission. Since technological hurdles
prevent such an attempt at the present time, there is also no example
of state practice by omission.l 16
Official statements also may be a demonstration of state
practice-even in the absence of physical practice."' This argument
presents the best evidence for the emergence of legal custom, as
there have been several instances in which private citizens have tried
to claim ownership of a celestial body."' National governments have
rebuked such claims, which at first glance may seem like evidence of
114. See generally Apollo Moon Rocks, SMITHSONIAN NAT'L AIR & SPACE
MUSEUM, http://www.nasm.si.edu/exhibitions/cchoice/moon
rocks/moonrocksl.htm (last visited May 12, 2011) (providing descriptions of lunar
rocks, such as basalt, collected by U.S. astronauts during the Apollo 15's landing
on the Moon).
115. See OST, supra note 30, art. 1 (guaranteeing the right to use the moon for
scientific investigation).
116. See The Challenge of Space Mining, SPACE DAILY (Sept. 14, 1999),
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/asteroid-99i.html (identifying numerous
technological barriers to space mining, including, the absence of a system for
processing rocks into valuable raw materials and a method of utilizing local raw
materials to propel mined materials back to Earth).
117. See Henckaerts, supra note 113, at 179 (noting that verbal acts may
include, inter alia, "military manuals, national legislation, national case-law,
instructions to armed and security forces, military communiqu6s during war,
diplomatic protests, opinions of official legal advisers, comments by governments
on draft treaties, executive decisions and regulations, pleadings before
international tribunals, statements in international fora, and government positions
on resolutions adopted by international organizations").
118. See, e.g., Nemitz v. United States, No. CV-N030599-HDM (RAM), 2004
WL 3167042 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 2004) (involving a plaintiff who asserted
ownership of 433 Eros and requested parking fees from NASA when the agency
landed a spacecraft on the asteroid); Court Rejects Lunar Embassy's Right ofMoon
Land Selling, CHINA.ORG.CN, March 17, 2007, http://www.china.org.cn./english
/China/203329.htm (describing the attempt by a Chinese company to sell parcels of
the Moon to individuals).
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state practice. 19
These situations do not provide evidence that contributes to an
emerging legal custom, however, because of a fundamental
difference from prospective space mining ventures. Space mining
would mostly involve the extraction of resources, 120 whereas these
cases revolve around whether a citizen may claim ownership of an
entire celestial body or plot of land. 12 1 Thus, it seems there is little
evidence of state practice that would give rise to a new custom based
on the Moon Treaty's principles. 122 Since the Moon Treaty does not
apply to the spacefaring nations, even as a matter of legal custom,
proponents of a strict non-appropriation policy for outer space must
find support in a widely accepted treaty: the OST.
B. THE OST IS THE APPROPRIATE TREATY FOR AN ANALYSIS OF
EXTRATERRESTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THOUGH AMBIGUITIES IN
THE TREATY PREVENT A CLEAR ANSWER AS TO WHETHER
PRIVATE ACTORS MAY EXTRACT MINERAL RESOURCES.
While some writers continue to argue the Moon Treaty's
relevancy, 123 the OST is the proper treaty to consult. 2 4 Like the
119. See Nemitz, 2004 WL 3167042, at *2 (dismissing a citizen's claim of
ownership of an asteroid because neither the United States' failure to ratify the
Moon Treaty, nor its acceptance of the OST granted private actors the right to
appropriate celestial bodies); see also Court rejects Lunar Embassy's Right of
Moon Land Selling, supra note 118 (reporting the ruling by the Beijing First
Intermediate People's Court that a Chinese company could not sell plots of the
Moon because neither individuals nor state actors could claim such ownership).
120. See generally M.J. Sonter, The Technical and Economic Feasibility of
Mining the Near-Earth Asteroids (paper presented at 45th IAF Congress, 1998),
available at http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/the technical and economic_
feasibilityof miningthenear earth asteriods.shtml (detailing the process for
removing resources from Earth-approaching asteroids and comets, and listing the
wide array of resources available in space, including water, ammonia, carbon
dioxide, methane, nickel-iron alloy, silicate minerals, hydrated minerals and
bituminous material).
121. See, e.g., Nemitz, 2004 WL 3167042 at *1 (describing the plaintiff's claim
of ownership of an asteroid).
122. Accordingly, there is no reason to address the opinio juris element of
custom formation, since custom cannot be formed if there is no state practice. Bos,
supra note 112, at 62.
123. See, e.g., Zach Meyer, Private Commercialization of Space in an
International Regime: A Proposal for a Space District, 30 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
241, 249-50 (arguing that the Moon Treaty is relevant because its principles are
reflected in the OST, and because certain states that have ratified the Moon Treaty
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Moon Treaty analysis, the OST should first be subjected to a good
faith interpretation, and in light of the treaty's purpose.'2 5 Once
again, using the Vienna Convention methodology, this analysis must
take into account the totality of the OST's provisions, including its
preamble and Articles 1, 2, and 6.126
The OST's preamble speaks to the drafters' intentions.127 It
recognizes the great potential of exploring outer space, as well as the
problems that could result from such exploration, expressing hope
for scientific cooperation and noting earlier efforts to prevent the
weaponization of outer space.128  Notably absent from this
introduction is the sort of property-based equitable sharing language
employed in the Moon Treaty.129 The OST's expressed object and
purpose to establish a general set of peaceful principles, rather than a
detailed property rights system, color the analysis of its operative
provisions.3 0
Article 1 is the first substantive clause that relates to property
claims and establishes the OST's fundamental presumption that outer
space is "free for exploration and use.""' Several other provisions in
may soon develop spacefaring capabilities, for example India).
124. See discussion, supra Part III.A.1.
125. See Vienna Convention, supra note 86, art. 31 (providing that an objective
analysis that looks at the treaty's text, along with its purpose, should be the first
step in interpreting the treaty).
126. See id. (stating that the entirety of the treaty's text, including its preamble
and annexes, should be used for interpretation).
127. See OST, supra note 30, pmbl. (enumerating general principles and
benefits underlying space exploration and recognizing prior international
resolutions); see also VILLIGER, supra note 99, at 428 (claiming that a preamble is
a traditional source of explanation for a treaty's object and purpose).
128. See OST, supra note 30, pmbl. (citing the goal of enhancing mutual
understanding and friendly relations between states and the prohibition of placing
nuclear or weapons of mass destruction in space or on celestial bodies).
129. Compare id. (calling for the benefits derived from space exploration to be
shared by all states), with Moon Treaty, supra note 30, pmbl. (recognizing the
benefits derived from lunar resources, and calling upon states to explore and use
these resources "on the basis of equality").
130. See generally Zell, supra note 26, at 489-90 (recognizing that the Cold War
fears of nuclear war caused the drafters of the OST to focus on preventing military
operations in space).
131. OST, supra note 30, art. 1 (granting access to outer space to "all States
without discrimination," thereby preventing any single state from excluding other
actors). See CHRISTOL, supra note 28, at 38-39 (explaining that the final version of
Article 1 established an important right for all states to access, use, and explore
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the Article are less clear, for example, the declaration that outer
space is the province of all mankind and that its exploration shall
benefit all nations. 3 2 This provision has been interpreted in several
ways,'3 3 but the generally accepted argument is that it confirms the
freedom of use because every state has an equal right to pursue space
activities.'3 4 Thus, the province of all mankind language is an
affirmation of general principles of access, rather than a prohibition
of certain activities.'3 5 Without more information to give meaning to
this article, its definition remains speculative.
The next relevant provision is found in Article 2, with its
prohibition on national appropriation.'3 6 The term "appropriation" is
admittedly more susceptible to an ordinary definition than the
phrases analyzed in Article 1.137 In light of the treaty's purpose,
drafters likely intended Article 2 to prevent territorial claims by
states in outer space or the moon, since such actions would frustrate
Article l's goal of equal access."' If a state claimed control over a
section of outer space for its exclusive use, that claim would infringe
on other states' right to equal access.'3 9
Read together with Article 1, the prohibition on national
space and its resources).
132. OST, supra note 30, art. 1.
133. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 32, at 585 (noting that developed states
interpret this language as establishing a right to participate, while developing states
view the same provision as establishing a right to equal distribution of resources
regardless of participation or contribution).
134. See CHRISTOL, supra note 28, at 39-42 (arguing that Article l's main
contribution was the concept of freedom of use, which necessarily implies the right
to exploit the benefits of space).
135. But see Thomas, supra note 32, at 585 (noting that the equal benefits
language may yet bar space exploration, since few investors will expend funds if
the results of their activities are shared by all).
136. See OST, supra note 30, art. 2 (prohibiting appropriation "by claim of
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means").
137. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 117-18 (9th ed. 2009) (defining
"appropriation" as "[t]he exercise of control over property" or "a taking of
possession").
138. See Vienna Convention, supra note 86, art. 31(1) (requiring any analysis of
treaty text to take into account the treaty's purpose); see also Thomas, supra note
32, at 586 (arguing that when read together, Articles I and 2 deny the right to
claim territory because of the impact such action would have on the right of
access).
139. Cf PENNER, supra note 19, at 70-71 (explaining that the right to use does
not necessarily equal the right to exclude, though they often go together in theory).
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appropriation establishes that outer space is a res communis, not
subject to the common heritage doctrine, which means that states are
free to use the area so long as their activities do not deprive other
states of the same right. 14 0 The OST fails to incorporate all of the
common heritage elements: while it provides for non-appropriation,
peaceful usage, and some form of benefits sharing, it does not
require the establishment of an international body to manage natural
resources, nor does it guarantee their preservation for future
generations.141 Accordingly, unlike the Moon Treaty which
incorporates all of the common heritage elements, outer space and
celestial bodies are not off-limits to development under the OST.142
Thus, the text of the OST establishes outer space as a res communis,
though further analysis may reveal that drafters did not intend for
that to forever be the case.143
Finally, Article 6 expands the OST's scope in a manner that
renders pointless any argument that claims Article 2 applies only to
government activities. 1" It provides that states are responsible for
ensuring compliance with the treaty's principles with respect to both
government activities and private actors.145 Thus, Article 6 is
important as it applies the rest of the treaty to all space activities,
preventing the treaty from being rendered toothless.146 Although the
140. See CHRISTOL, supra note 28, at 44-48 (noting that U.S. officials drew on
res communis concepts that had previously been applied to the high seas to help
conceptualize legal rules that would apply to outer space).
141. Compare OST, supra note 30, arts. 1, 2, 4 (establishing that nations must
not weaponize outer space or claim control over outer space, and that benefits
derived from exploration should be enjoyed by all), with Fountain, supra note 23,
at 1759 (providing a list of the five elements of the common heritage of mankind
principle).
142. Compare OST, supra note 30, art. 1, with Moon Treaty, supra note 30, art.
11 (demonstrating the emergence of calls for an international body to manage the
Moon's mineral resources, resulting in the Moon Treaty).
143. See VTLLIGER, supra note 99, at 447 (noting that Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention allows for supplementary means of interpretation even where the
definition of a treaty term may be apparent).
144. See OST, supra note 30, art. 6 (noting that the OST applies to both
government and non-governmental entities).
145. See id. (declaring that non-governmental entities still require "authorization
and continuing supervision" from the State Party for any activities conducted in
space or on a celestial body).
146. See CHRISTOL, supra note 28, at 48-49 (noting that Article 6 focuses on
operational aspects of space law, while Articles 1 and 2 establish substantive
principles).
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text of Article 6 is sufficient to establish its meaning without
requiring contextual information for clarification,147 which principles
of Article 6 apply to private activities remain unclear without a
distinct definition of the other articles.
After this good faith interpretation of the OST, it would be
disingenuous to suggest that its text provides a clear statement on
whether private actors may extract mineral resources from celestial
bodies. The only safe conclusion is that the OST's authority is not
limited to states. Presumably, a state will act to ensure private actors
are in compliance with the OST's principles to avoid violating the
treaty, lest it provoke other states to ignore the treaty. Therefore,
further investigation is required to determine whether a private actor
may enjoy the right to harvest extraterrestrial resources.
Nonetheless, the OST has received widespread support, especially
among the spacefaring nations.'4 8 Moreover, the OST is the first and
most important source of space law.149 Any investigation with respect
to rules for mineral resources therefore should be based on the OST,
rather than its less-accepted descendent.
C. As OST's PROPERTY PROVISIONS REMAIN AMBIGUOUS WITH
RESPECT TO MINERAL EXTRACTION, FURTHER CONTEXTUAL
INFORMATION MAY BE USED TO CLARIFY THIS ISSUE.
While the OST's text provides the primary source for
interpretation, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention provides that
other information may be used to supplement the textual analysis.'s
These supplementary means include, but are not limited to, the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its
conclusion.'"' This secondary analysis may either confirm or clarify a
textual interpretation. 52
147. Vienna Convention, supra note 86, art. 32 (explaining the instances in
which "recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation") (emphasis
added).
148. See OOSA - Treaty Database, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS,
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosatdb/showTreatySignatures.do (last visited May
12, 2011) (indicating that nearly one-hundred states are parties to the OST).
149. See TRONCHETTI, supra note 10, at 19 (acknowledging that subsequent
treaties largely built on OST's work).
150. Vienna Convention, supra note 86, art. 32.
151. Id.
152. Id.; see also VILLIGER, supra note 99, at 446-47 (explaining the several
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1. Preparatory Work
Article 1's definition was subject to controversy, if not in
substance then in its rhetorical style. 15 All drafters agreed that
exploration of outer space should be peaceful in nature. 154
Differences arose when discussions turned to how the benefits
derived from space exploration should be shared among nations.1 5
Many delegations felt that such benefit sharing ought to be limited to
information or the results of scientific investigations.15 6 Going
further, some developing states argued that the practical benefits of
space should be shared, even with those nations that did not
participate in the exploratory process. 157 Essentially, it was a question
of whether all states should be treated as equals in fact or simply be
given the opportunity to have equal access.' Ultimately, the drafters
decided on the less intrusive principle, setting the tone for the rest of
the treaty by establishing that the freedom to use space is a positive
right that can only be defeated by a corresponding restriction found
later in the treaty.159
reasons why a person may need to resort to Article 32).
153. Cf CHRISTOL, supra note 28, at 42 (accepting that Article I was generally
stated because the purpose of the Treaty was to establish general principles rather
than definitive regulations).
154. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, COPUOS, Legal Subcomm., 5th Sess., 71st mtg. at
4, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.65 (July 22, 1966) [hereinafter COPUOS, 5th
Sess., 65th mtg.] (statement of Mr. Ruda of Argentina) (arguing that an obligation
to explore space peacefully was self-evident based on the text of Article 4 and the
treaty's overall objectives).
155. Compare id (statement of Mr. Partli of Hungary) (noting that whether
information is shared should be left up to those nations that sacrificed the most for
exploration), with COPUOS, Legal Subcomm., Interim Report by the Chairman,
annex 2 at 6, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.16 (Sept. 6, 1966) [hereinafter United
Arab Republic: Proposal] (prepared by United Arab Republic) (calling for all
nations to enjoy the practical benefits of outer space).
156. See COPUOS, 5th Sess., 65th mtg., supra note 154, at 4 (statement of Mr.
Partli of Hungary) (arguing that states which actually invested in space exploration
should have discretion to disclose the results obtained as a result of their efforts).
157. See United Arab Republic: Proposal, supra note 155, at 6 (proposing that
any benefits obtained from the exploration or use of outer space should be shared
by all nations).
158. Similar problems arose and were resolved in the context of the law of the
sea. See UNCLOS, supra note 56, art. 17 (granting landlocked states the right to
innocent passage through the territorial sea, though not conveying the resources to
allow such activities).
159. See COPUOS, Legal Subcomm., Rep. on its 5th Sess., July 12-Aug. 4,
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While current work focuses on whether Article 2 provided such a
clear restriction on the right to use space, discussions among the OST
drafters on that provision were notably lacking in frequency and
length.'60 The language in Article 2 was based on an earlier U.N.
resolution that sought "to avoid the extension of present national
rivalries" into outer space.' 6 ' Article 2 added substance to this goal,
which the resolution lacked.16 2 Many delegates praised its inclusion
in the OST, and some even alluded to the Article's dual purposes of
prohibiting sovereign claims as well as private law claims of
property.'63 Despite perceptions to the contrary, not all delegations
believed it was proper to attach such a broad meaning to the vague
non-appropriation clause.164 For instance, one delegate recognized
that it was quite impossible to predict how future technologies would
allow for the use of outer space, specifically referencing extraction of
lunar resources, and cautioned against premature regulation of such
activities. 165
1966, annex II at 12, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/35 (Sept. 16, 1966) (providing text of
Article 2 as accepted by the Legal Sub-Committee's working group); see also
CHISTOL, supra note 28, at 38-43 (analyzing preparatory work and confirming
that OST drafters intended Article 1 to guarantee exploitation when they provided
the right to use outer space, but noting that the drafters' discussion focused more
on the potential benefits derived from remote sensing and communications
satellites than the issue of resource extraction).
160. See, e.g., COPUOS, 5th Sess., 71st Mtg., supra note 52, at 10 (statement of
Mr. Hemdl of Austria) (arguing that the non-appropriation language was vague,
but failing to indicate what the provision might mean).
161. G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/1348 (XIII) (Dec. 13,
1958).
162. Compare id with OST, supra note 30, art. 2 ("Outer space . . . is not
subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means.").
163. See COPUOS, 5th Sess., 71st Mtg., supra note 52, at 7 (statement of Mr.
Bal of Belgium) (noting the Belgian delegation's acceptance of this interpretation,
and observing that such interpretation was "apparently without contradiction"
among the delegations).
164. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, COPUOS, Legal Subcomm., 5th Sess., 63d mtg. at
8, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.63 (July 20, 1966) [hereinafter COPUOS, 5th
Sess., 63d Mtg.] (statement of Mr. Deleau of France) (claiming that the text of
Article 2 failed to clearly establish which types of activities would fall under the
term "use" and that the provision should be open to "further textual
improvements").
165. See id. (stressing that states should clarify the scope of the OST, and avoid
attempting to regulate future technologies in the absence of a clear understanding
of the "complex issues" those technologies entail).
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Other delegates, most notably the Soviet representative, agreed
with the cautious approach by recognizing that international law
should be focused on present realities rather than fictions. 166 This
method is not new. For instance, the drafters of the 1958 High Seas
Convention did not regulate artificial islands such as oil rigs because
it was a fairly immature technology at the time, but by 1982 it was
sufficiently developed to warrant inclusion in UNCLOS.167
Therefore, the preparatory work does little to clarify the Article's
meaning because prudence demands that international law regulate
realities and impending problems, not possibilities in the distant
future.16 8
The drafters' commentary on Article 6 reveals even less
information regarding the treaty's impact on mineral extraction:
meeting records show that the debate revolved around the Article's
scope, namely whether the OST should extend to international
organizations.169 This question was important for many states
because exploring the heavens was not practical without cooperation
with other nations.' Thus, Article 6 is a clear recognition that space
166. See id. at 10-1I (statement of Mr. Morozov of the USSR) (acknowledging
that the Soviet Union felt "it would be unwise to look too far ahead and to attempt
to prescribe rules for situations on which it was impossible to form adequate
judgement [sic] at the present stage").
167. Compare Convention on the High Seas, supra note 56, art. 1 (omitting
mention of oil rigs or artificial islands on the high seas, or the right to make use of
mineral resources located therein), with UNCLOS, supra note 56, art. 87
(permitting the construction of artificial islands on the high seas subject to the
restrictions on mineral extraction enumerated later in the treaty). See generally
Ross D. ECKERT, THE ENCLOSURE OF OCEAN RESOURCES: ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW OF THE SEA 94-99 (1979) (explaining that the depth of waters for offshore oil
wells was limited to about 100 meters in 1965, but significantly increased in depth
due to technological advancements by the late 1970s).
168. See GANGALE, supra note 13, at 87 (arguing that "anticipatory lawmaking"
is inappropriate in areas involving complex technologies because lawmakers must
rely on assumptions about the future rather than experience, which may lead to the
development of legal norms that lack practical effect).
169. See COPUOS, 5th Sess., 57th Mtg., supra note 37, at 13 (statement of Mr.
Morozov of the USSR) (explicating the Soviet position that when international
organizations act in space, responsibility for compliance with the OST rests on the
international organization itself as well as the States Parties).
170. See U.N. GAOR, COPUOS, Legal Subcomm., 5th Sess., 67th mtg. at 3,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.67 (July 25, 1966) (statement of Mr. Morozov of the
USSR) (observing that "in certain countries activities in space could not be
confined to the State"); see also 1 J. KRIGE & A. RusSo, A HISTORY OF THE
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activities are not limited to states, yet fails to address the nature of
such efforts.
The OST's property provisions remain ambiguous after this
analysis of the preparatory work. While there was agreement on the
fact that Article I was focused on the peaceful nature of outer space,
the discussions do not reveal whether its drafters contemplated
private resource extraction. Instead, the records indicate they focused
primarily on claims of territorial sovereignty and did not clarify the
extent to which Article 2 governed the use of outer space.
2. Circumstances of OST's Conclusion
Sources that are not traditionally considered legal can be valuable
for treaty interpretation, as these sources go to the drafters' state of
mind."' Accordingly, the Cold War and concomitant 1960s space
race are considerable factors that should be taken into account for
analyzing the OST. 17 2
This perilous era, when nuclear holocaust occasionally seemed
inevitable, influenced the treaty's drafters and the speed with which
they worked."' Some recognized the dangers of locating weapons of
mass destruction in outer space, hoping that at least one sphere of
human activity could be free of that horror.174 Others were apparently
EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY: 1958-1987 9-11 (2000), available at
www.esa.int/esapub /sp/spl235/ spl235vlweb.pdf (noting that a ravaged postwar
Europe was not able to compete with the Cold War superpowers, thus requiring
those states to come together in what became the European Space Agency).
171. See VILLIGER, sup!a note 99, at 445 (arguing that the Vienna Convention
allows for scholars to acknowledge "the political, social, and cultural factors" that
surround a treaty's conclusion).
172. See generally PETER G. BOYLE, AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS: FROM THE
RUSSIAN REVOLUTION TO THE FALL OF COMMUNISM 54-70 (1993) (exploring the
historical origins of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union
beginning in the mid-1940s that led up to the Cold War).
173. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, COPUOS, Legal Subcomm., 5th Sess., 72d mtg. at
3, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.72 (Sept. 12 1966) [hereinafter COPUOS, 5th
Sess., 72d Mtg.] (statement of Mr. Goldberg of the United States) (declaring that
successful steps toward a moon landing, not yet a race clearly won by the United
States, demonstrated the urgent need for a treaty on general principles governing
outer space). But see 113 CONG. REC. 10682 (1967) (statement of Sen. Thurmond)
(arguing that a treaty is incapable of preventing nuclear warfare because "the
Soviet record indicates that they will violate this treaty as soon as it fits their
strategy of world conquest").
174. See Zell, supra note 26, at 489-90 (observing that many people feared that
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more concerned that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union
should be allowed to lay claim to the Moon as an extension of their
territory."'
Acknowledging this political environment yields an undeniable
result: the drafters did not set out to create a comprehensive legal
document to govern space for all eternity. On the contrary, the OST
represents a diplomatic stopgap hurriedly prepared before the first
landing on the moon could ignite a new theater of Cold War
conflict.'7 6 Given this context, the drafters could not have intended a
rule against private extraction of lunar minerals since Cold War-era
technology was insufficiently developed to allow for such activities.
3. Subsequent State Interpretations
Subsequent practice in the application of a treaty that demonstrates
agreement regarding its interpretation may be taken into account
when clarifying its meaning. ' In the case of non-appropriation of
celestial bodies, there are few acts of commission to show agreement
on the issue."' States that have sent probes and manned missions to
such bodies have indeed recognized the OST's hostility to sovereign
claims.'7 9 Furthermore, states have refused to recognize the claims of
"cold war brinkmanship" would lead to the introduction of nuclear weapons into
outer space).
175. See Thomas, supra note 32, at 589-91 (reasoning that the United States and
Soviet Union agreed to the OST in order to "fix the odds" of the 1960s space race
and avoid the possibility of letting their opponent lay claim to the moon).
176. Cf U.N. GAOR, COPUOS, Legal Subcomm., 5th Sess., 61st mtg. at 7,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/SC.2/SR.61 (Jul. 18, 1966) (statement of Mr. Bal of
Belgium) (recognizing that diplomatic efforts of the 1960s were not expected to
produce a definitive codification of space law).
177. Vienna Convention, supra note 86, art. 31(3)(b); see also VLLIGER, supra
note 89, at 429 (explaining that states' "authentic interpretation" of a treaty may
alter the treaty's effect).
178. See generally Sheera Frankel, Writing the Rules to Govern the Cosmos,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 4, 2004, at 15 (detailing examples of unusual
attempts at private appropriation of space, such as when three Yemeni brothers
claimed to inherit the planet Mars from their ancestors over 3,000 years ago).
179. See ANNE M. PLATOFF, WHERE No FLAG HAS GONE BEFORE: POLITICAL
AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF PLACING A FLAG ON THE MOON (1993), available at
http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/history/flag/flag.htm (outlining the debate that preceded
the Apollo 11 crew's planting of the U.S. flag on the Moon, and acknowledging
the purely symbolic value of this gesture in light of the OST's prohibition on
national appropriation).
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Earth-bound citizens who have laid claim to celestial bodies or sold
plots of land on the moon.s 0 However, none of these examples deals
with a private actor who physically traveled to a celestial body and
extracted its resources. In the absence of such an example, there is no
clear demonstration of state practice regarding the specific issue at
hand.
Looking to Article 2's various interpretations in the early era of
space law reveals that states shared no common view of the
provision's effect. Debates in the U.S. Senate over whether to
consent to the treaty's ratification demonstrate the nation's
contemporary understanding of the provision.' Not once did the
senators praise, decry, or even recognize the OST's impact on private
actors. 18 2 The only references to Article 2, while not explicit, were in
the context of national sovereignty.'8 3 Moreover, several recognized
the treaty's role as a building block to the body of space law, rather
than the exclusive document to regulate that area. 8 4 Given the
number of floor speeches regarding the OST, it seems to be a safe
conclusion that space mining was not considered at the time.
Outside the United States, states may have attached other
meanings to Article 2. Diplomats from non-Anglophone nations
explained several years after the OST's adoption that linguistic
180. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (describing a case involving
Nemitz, a U.S. citizen, who attempt to assert ownership over an asteroid); see also
Letter from Ralph L. Braibanti, Dir., Space & Advanced Tech., U.S. Dep't of
State, to Gregory William Nemitz (Jan. 21, 2003), available at
http://www.erosproject.com/exhibit01.html (stating that the State Department
interpreted OST's Article 2 in a manner that prevents private ownership of an
entire asteroid).
181. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REc. 2781-82 (1967) (relaying President Johnson's
support of the OST and his message to the Senate, which touched primarily on
themes of national security, peace, and cooperation).
182. See, e.g., id. at 2782 (limiting discussion of the principles in Article 2 to the
OST's impact on the space race in Cold War terms, hinting at the benefit of
preventing the Soviet Union from being able to claim the moon). While the
President hinted that extraterrestrial resources may solve the problem of resource
scarcity on Earth, he made no mention of private actors, choosing instead to couch
these statements in terms of nation-building and peace promotion. Id.
183. See, e.g., id. at 2783 (alluding to Article 2's purpose as a prohibition of
national sovereignty claims to the Moon while failing to consider private claims or
different types of property).
184. See id. at 2781 (acknowledging that the OST was "an interim
achievement-a significant, but not a final step forward").
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differences prevented a singular interpretation, for example, a
Mexican official noted that Hispanophones and Francophones attach
a particular meaning to the common heritage terminology.' As a
result, several nations apparently believed that the OST had already
incorporated the common heritage of mankind.'16
Where conflicting interpretations arise for a treaty authenticated in
more than one language, the meaning most in line with the treaty's
object and purpose should be adopted.' As the OST's purpose was
to establish basic principles regarding outer space and to avoid Cold
War complications rather than articulate a new theory of property,
the less restrictive res communis theory is appropriate because the
spacefaring nations were concerned about claims of territorial
sovereignty, not the use of mineral resources.' 8
4. Making Use of Other Spheres ofHuman Activity
More than forty years after the drafting of the OST, considerable
advances in technology have made the prospect of commercial space
mining increasingly realistic.18 9 Yet, the OST's ambiguity with
respect to the question of whether private actors may extract minerals
in outer space hinders these developments. 190 Moreover, the
185. See U.N. GAOR, COPUOS, Legal Subcomm., 13th Sess., 212th mtg. at 36,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.212 (May 10, 1974) (statement of Mr. Vallarta of
Mexico) (noting that the Spanish and French terms for the common heritage
principle, "patrimoine" and "patrimonio" respectively, signify "the State's
property").
186. See id. (noting the Mexican delegation's belief that the common heritage
principle applied to outer space because similar Spanish terms were used to
describe the legal status of the sea-bed and ocean floor during the Conference on
the Law of the Sea). But see id. at 37 (statement of Mr. Maiorski of the USSR)
(asserting that while some delegations believe the OST incorporated the common
heritage principle, the Russian text did no such thing, and observing that, in
Russian, the concepts of heritage and property are not linked as they are in
Spanish).
187. See Vienna Convention, supra note 86, art. 33 (acknowledging that a
precise interpretation may not be possible without reconciling linguistic
differences).
188. See discussion, supra Parts II.B-C (arguing that, in light of the OST's text
and the Cold War context in which the treaty developed, the OST was intended to
limit the spread of weapons, rather than apply the new common heritage theory).
189. Zullo, supra note 4, at 2438.
190. See Fountain, supra note 23, at 1764 (recognizing that mining companies
need legal assurance that the fruits of their investment will remain company
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international community prefers to avoid such gaps in the law.191
Accordingly, other rules of international law should be considered
from spheres of activity without sovereign claims.
a. Maritime Law
Many scholars are fond of using UNCLOS to clarify space law
because of similarities between the areas: inherent difficulties in
exerting exclusive control and a historical basis for non-
sovereignty.'9 2 Such arguments ignore the fact that UNCLOS was
adopted more than a decade after the OST and embraced a
controversial property theory that hindered the treaty's acceptance. 193
In fact, UNCLOS bears more historical ties to the Moon Treaty,
which this Comment has already shown to be of little relevance.194
Analyses should instead look to the 1958 High Seas Convention
because it was a res communis treaty in force at the time the OST
was adopted.'9 5
The 1958 treaty shows how liberties resembling limited property
rights may exist in a res communis.196 For instance, Article 2 gives
property).
191. See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 51-52 (June 27) (Oda, J., dissenting)
(explaining the debate over whether a legal system may recognize a gap in
substantive law, and the international community's tendency to avoid such a
finding).
192. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 32, at 601-29 (arguing that a modified form
of the UNCLOS should be used to govern outer space); see also Zullo, supra note
4, at 2442-44 (relying on UNCLOS while ignoring the maritime law that was in
place at the time of OST's adoption).
193. See discussion supra Part II.C (discussing UNCLOS and the subsequent
treaty used to modify the original document's interpretation of the common
heritage principle).
194. See U.N. GAOR, COPUOS, Legal Subcomm., 12th Sess., 192d mtg. at 11-
12, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.192 (Mar. 26, 1973) (statement of Mr. Rao of
India) (noting the relevance of the Moon Treaty's development to the principles
considered by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and Ocean
Floor); see also discussion supra Part III.A (dismissing the Moon Treaty's
relevance given the fact that it applies to no spacefaring nation).
195. See Vienna Convention, supra note 86, art. 32 (allowing for treaties to be
interpreted based on contextual information at the time of their conclusion).
196. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 56, art. 2 (embracing the
notion that the high seas are free from sovereignty claims); see also discussion
supra Part II.A (distinguishing the common heritage of mankind and res communis
theories).
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states the right to fish the high seas, implying that fishermen retain
good legal title over their catch.197 This supports the idea that
resources located within the res communis may be separated from the
area itself, meaning that under the 1958 legal regime, even if a state
could not appropriate the high seas, it could still make use of its
resources. 98 While the OST drafters did not contemplate the status of
minerals that are physically extracted from the Moon or other
celestial bodies, the fishing rights example shows that contemporary
international law at least allowed for such distinctions at the time the
OST was concluded. 199
Furthermore, states were allowed to lay down pipes and cables on
the seabed, which would effectively exclude others from accessing
that specific area. 200 This practice is similar to how a state uses a
geostationary satellite, as its orbit inherently excludes others from
accessing that area, so there was a basis for distinguishing removable
resources from the land (or water) itself.201 Therefore, it seems that
the OST drafters could have conceived of differences between a res
communis and its movable resources.
b. Antarctic Treaty
Given the Antarctic Treaty System's historical relationship with
the OST, it often is cited in scholarly analysis of the latter's
treatment of extraterrestrial resources.2 02 Textual similarities
197. See id (allowing for the reasonable use of high seas fisheries); see also
ECKERT, supra note 167, at 142-45 (recognizing that the right to fish the high seas
implies two types of property rights: a limited right in the uncaught fish, and
complete ownership over the fish once caught).
198. Cf ECKERT, supra note 167, at 144-45 (arguing that the 1958 treaties
created limited property rights in uncaught fish that were ambiguously apportioned
among coastal and in-land states, though such rights were not exclusive).
199. Cf UNCLOS, supra note 56, art. 87(2) (granting the right to fish in the
high seas subject to other regulations intended to guarantee that right for all
nations).
200. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 56, art. 2(3) (allowing states
to place objects on the ocean floor, inherently leading to the conclusion that such
action would exclude other states from using the affected area for a similar
purpose).
201. See Kurt Anderson Baca, Property Rights in Outer Space, 58 J. AIR L. &
COM. 1041, 1071-83 (1993) (arguing that in practice the current system of
geostationary orbital slot locations grants a limited and temporary set of property
rights to a state controlling the slot).
202. See, e.g., Julie A. Jiru, Comment, Star Wars and Space Malls: When the
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strengthen the analogy: peaceful use, equal access, and the freedom
of scientific investigation are integral principles of both
documents.2 03 Statements from several OST drafters, however,
indicate that as with maritime law, ATS analogies are persuasive but
not controlling. 204 Therefore, it does not necessarily follow that the
same arguments over whether Antarctica is the common heritage of
mankind or a res nullius automatically apply to outer space.2 05 More
to the point, persistent conflict over Antarctica's status prevents a
clear example of consistent state practice since the legality of
resource extraction largely depends on which property theory
applies.206
5. Failure to Overcome the Presumption ofFreedom of Use
These supplementary interpretation-methods show there was a
great deal of confusion over what activities Article 2 restricted. Its
drafters and supporters apparently saw it as a provision to alleviate
Cold War tensions, indicating that the right to use outer space
currently extends to the right to extract mineral resources. The
contextual information does not sufficiently clarify Article 2 so as to
override the presumption of free use that was established in Article
1.207
Paint Chips Off a Treaty's Golden Handcuffs, 42 S. TEX. L. REv. 155, 162-63
(2000) (citing the Antarctic Treaty System as an example of the United States'
reluctance to agree to international resource management treaties).
203. See The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 57, arts. 1-2 (providing that
Antarctica is to be used peacefully with freedom of scientific investigation); see
also discussion supra Part II.B (describing the OST's provisions).
204. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, COPUOS, Legal Subcomm., 5th Sess., 60th mtg. at
4, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.60 (July 15, 1966) (statement of Mr. Ruda of
Argentina) (rejecting the analogy between Antarctica and outer space on the
grounds that states established territorial claims on Antarctica).
205. See COPUOS, 5th Sess., 65th mtg., supra note 154, at 11 (statement of Mr.
Morozov of the USSR) (proclaiming that outer space is a wholly new sphere of
human activity therefore limiting the applicability of the Antarctic Treaty System);
see also Weaver, supra note 27, at 231 (recognizing that few could argue that outer
space is a res nullius due to the difficulties in controlling outer space).
206. See TRONCHETTI, supra note 10, at 145 (describing conflict over the
industrialized nations' attempt to allow Antarctic mining, provoking the Non-
Alignment Movement to formally request that the United Nations consider the
question of Antarctica).
207. See generally CHRISTOL, supra note 28, at 38-40 (recognizing that Article I
created a broad right to use outer space so long as the use complies with both
international law and is for the benefit of mankind).
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IV.RECOMMENDATIONS
As this Comment illustrates, the OST does not present a clear
answer as to whether private actors are forbidden from mining
extraterrestrial minerals. Its drafters likely did not even contemplate
such a question.208 International law does not accommodate such
legal lacuna, 2 09 however, so diplomatic efforts should be made to
research the scientific implications of space mining, ascertain states'
opinions, and make recommendations.
A. THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD PASS A RESOLUTION
CALLING FOR THE COPUOS LEGAL SUB-COMMITTEE TO STUDY
LEGAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FUTURE OF SPACE
EXPLORATION AND USE.
Legal adaptation does not always happen quickly on the
international stage, particularly in the context of treaty negotiations.
To facilitate this process, discussions on legal problems due to
emerging technologies should begin prior to contentious treaty
negotiations.2 10
1. COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee
There is precedent for COPUOS to take responsibility in analyzing
emerging legal issues.2 1 1 This method is not without its drawbacks; it
focuses on diplomatic consensus rather than encouraging a
transparent voting process.2 12 Thus, a reiteration of this process may
208. See COPUOS, 5th Sess., 63d Mtg., supra note 164, at 10-11 (statement of
Mr. Morozov of the USSR) (recognizing that it is impossible, or impractical, to
attempt to create international law to govern practices that do not yet exist and that
upon the creation of new human abilities, new rules must be created).
209. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
210. See U.N. GAOR, COPUOS, 24th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.24
(Nov. 22, 1963) (statement of the Chairman) (lauding the Legal Sub-Committee's
work and exchange of ideas, which led to fewer disagreements with respect to the
principles of space law as the Committee began drafting the OST).
211. See id. (noting the benefits derived from the Committee's discussion of
principles set out in the first General Assembly space law resolution).
212. Cf Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, The Lawmaking Process in the United Nations,
in SPACE LAw: DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE, supra note 29, at 36 (explaining that
COPUOS operates on an informal rule that calls for consensus, which arguably
causes drawn-out negotiations, the ability for a lone state to prevent the adoption of
a treaty, and a forum for extended conflicts between parties who disagree).
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not yield a product any less ambiguous than the OST. Nevertheless,
COPUOS would be a legitimate forum to resolve oft-cited space law
problems.
a. Different Regions, Separate Treaties
The first step toward a satisfactory space law system is to finally
acknowledge the inherent differences between outer space and
celestial bodies.2 13 Space is indeed very much like the high seas in
that it is physically difficult to maintain exclusive control over a
given area. 2 14 Given this natural frustration of property rights in any
form, the OST's current prescription of free access and non-
sovereignty seems a logical conclusion.2 15
Celestial bodies, on the other hand, are different from the vacuum
of space because they have mass and composition.216 This difference
theoretically makes it easier for a private actor to exclude others on
such bodies, as one limits access only to a base on the surface. The
one similarity between outer space and celestial bodies is that present
technology prevents both from being readily accessible to the vast
majority of the world. A future treaty system that supplements the
OST therefore should divide the issue, much as the 1958 maritime
treaties distinguished between the high seas and benefits to be
derived from that area.2 17 This resolution will guarantee that legal
discussions may accurately reflect scientific realities.
b. Incremental Exploration
A problem with many scholarly recommendations for changes to
213. See Thomas, supra note 32, at 606-10 (arguing that outer space should be
divided by a series of zones subject to varying property theories, just as UNCLOS
did for the seas).
214. See Weaver, supra note 27, at 231 (relying on the historical example that
colonial naval powers were unable to support claims of sovereignty over the high
seas because the states lacked the ability to assert actual control).
215. See discussion, supra Part I1I.B-C (demonstrating that OST relies on the
notion of free access to space subject to various limitations).
216. But see Thomas, supra note 32, at 607 (recognizing that even a zoning
system for celestial bodies would need to be flexible, as celestial bodies range from
Earth-like planets to asteroids to gas giants).
217. Cf Treves, supra note 58, at 1-2 (stating that the 1958 treaties split up
perceived problems into several treaties to attract acceptance of some of the
Conference's results, if not all of them).
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space law is that they are too broad; authors desire a treaty that either
forbids or permits mineral extraction. 2 18 There is no middle ground in
such arguments, and they advocate the drafting of a treaty prior to
the maturation of the relevant technologies or at least to a degree that
is wholly unrealistic-a problem that the OST drafters wished to
avoid.219
Accordingly, COPUOS should find a compromise with an
incremental perspective that allows for prospecting missions. For
instance, states-and by implication, their juridical persons-could
pursue limited exploration missions with an economic focus, rather
than pure science. Such activities could experiment with mineral
extraction on a very limited basis, using small landers and rovers,2 20
allowing for states and private actors to determine the feasibility of
wide-scale mineral extraction, which would require a further set of
diplomatic negotiations.22 1 In the meantime, however, those entities
that undertake such activities could stand to benefit from terrestrial
applications of the technologies they develop for space mining.2 22
V. CONCLUSION
International space law must adapt to changing circumstances in
order to remain relevant, just as maritime law has evolved in the face
of new technologies and practices since Grotius wrote Mare
218. See, e.g., Brandon C. Gruner, A New Hope for International Space Law:
Incorporating Nineteenth Century First Possession Principles Into the 1967 Space
Treaty for the Colonization of Outer Space in the Twenty-First Century, 35 SETON
HALL L. REV. 299, 344-55 (2004) (proposing that outer space be declared a res
nullius, subject to the property rule of capture).
219. See COPUOS, 5th Sess., 63d Mtg., supra note 164, at 10-11 (statement of
Mr. Morozov of the USSR) (stressing the imprudence of applying treaties to
theoretical problems).
220. Cf BROWN, supra note 76, at 105-06 (describing how an early phase of
mineral extraction for the seabed would take the form of prospecting, allowing for
actors to explore for deposits of minerals but without acquiring exclusive rights
over such resources).
221. See U.N. GAOR, COPUOS, Legal Subcomm., 12th Sess., 204th mtg. at 88-
89, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.204 (Apr. 18, 1973) (statement of Mr. Yoshida of
Japan) (stating that "it was too early to elaborate provisions" for the commercial
use of the moon's natural resources as there was insufficient knowledge as to the
"quality and quantity" of such resources).
222. See generally Zell, supra note 27, at 494 (recognizing the tangential
benefits associated with the 1960s space race, resulting in useful and profitable
products for Earth-based markets, such as faster computers).
1516 [26:5
2011] EXTRATERRESTRIAL RESOURCE EXTRACTION 1517
Liberum. Unlike the high seas, however, developments in the use of
outer space must be preceded by legal changes. Whereas the seas had
the benefit of a disorderly international system and relatively simple
technologies, space development will require expensive and lengthy
missions. Without legal certainty, the private sector may be
unwilling to gamble on this new frontier, and without investment in
space enterprise, humanity's destiny of exploration will be
unfulfilled.
* * *
